

Required fields are shown with yellow backgrounds and asterisks.

Page 1 of * 36	SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549 Form 19b-4		File No.* SR - 2013 - * 105	Amendment No. (req. for Amendments *)
Filing by NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC. Pursuant to Rule 19b-4 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934				
Initial * <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Amendment * <input type="checkbox"/>	Withdrawal <input type="checkbox"/>	Section 19(b)(2) * <input type="checkbox"/>	Section 19(b)(3)(A) * <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
			Section 19(b)(3)(B) * <input type="checkbox"/>	
			Rule	
Pilot <input type="checkbox"/>	Extension of Time Period for Commission Action * <input type="checkbox"/>	Date Expires * <input type="text"/>	<input type="checkbox"/> 19b-4(f)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 19b-4(f)(4)
			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 19b-4(f)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 19b-4(f)(5)
			<input type="checkbox"/> 19b-4(f)(3)	<input type="checkbox"/> 19b-4(f)(6)
Notice of proposed change pursuant to the Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Act of 2010			Security-Based Swap Submission pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934	
Section 806(e)(1) <input type="checkbox"/>		Section 806(e)(2) <input type="checkbox"/>	Section 3C(b)(2) <input type="checkbox"/>	
Exhibit 2 Sent As Paper Document <input type="checkbox"/>	Exhibit 3 Sent As Paper Document <input type="checkbox"/>			
<b>Description</b>				
Provide a brief description of the action (limit 250 characters, required when Initial is checked *).				
<input type="text" value="A Proposed Rule Change to Establish for PHLX Orders Managed Data Solution Fees for Non-Display Usage."/>				
<b>Contact Information</b>				
Provide the name, telephone number, and e-mail address of the person on the staff of the self-regulatory organization prepared to respond to questions and comments on the action.				
First Name *	<input type="text" value="Jonathan"/>	Last Name *	<input type="text" value="Cayne"/>	
Title *	<input type="text" value="Associate General Counsel"/>			
E-mail *	<input type="text" value="jonathan.cayne@nasdaqomx.com"/>			
Telephone *	<input type="text" value="(301) 978-8493"/>	Fax	<input type="text" value="(301) 978-8472"/>	
<b>Signature</b>				
Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,				
has duly caused this filing to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned thereunto duly authorized.				
(Title *)				
Date	<input type="text" value="10/16/2013"/>	<input type="text" value="Executive Vice President and General Counsel"/>		
By	<input type="text" value="Edward S. Knight"/>	<input type="text" value="Edward S Knight,"/>		
(Name *)				
NOTE: Clicking the button at right will digitally sign and lock this form. A digital signature is as legally binding as a physical signature, and once signed, this form cannot be changed.				

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549

For complete Form 19b-4 instructions please refer to the EFFF website.

**Form 19b-4 Information \***

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The self-regulatory organization must provide all required information, presented in a clear and comprehensible manner, to enable the public to provide meaningful comment on the proposal and for the Commission to determine whether the proposal is consistent with the Act and applicable rules and regulations under the Act.

**Exhibit 1 - Notice of Proposed Rule Change \***

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The Notice section of this Form 19b-4 must comply with the guidelines for publication in the Federal Register as well as any requirements for electronic filing as published by the Commission (if applicable). The Office of the Federal Register (OFR) offers guidance on Federal Register publication requirements in the Federal Register Document Drafting Handbook, October 1998 Revision. For example, all references to the federal securities laws must include the corresponding cite to the United States Code in a footnote. All references to SEC rules must include the corresponding cite to the Code of Federal Regulations in a footnote. All references to Securities Exchange Act Releases must include the release number, release date, Federal Register cite, Federal Register date, and corresponding file number (e.g., SR-[SRO]-xx-xx). A material failure to comply with these guidelines will result in the proposed rule change being deemed not properly filed. See also Rule 0-3 under the Act (17 CFR 240.0-3)

**Exhibit 1A- Notice of Proposed Rule Change, Security-Based Swap Submission, or Advance Notice by Clearing Agencies**

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The Notice section of this Form 19b-4 must comply with the guidelines for publication in the Federal Register as well as any requirements for electronic filing as published by the Commission (if applicable). The Office of the Federal Register (OFR) offers guidance on Federal Register publication requirements in the Federal Register Document Drafting Handbook, October 1998 Revision. For example, all references to the federal securities laws must include the corresponding cite to the United States Code in a footnote. All references to SEC rules must include the corresponding cite to the Code of Federal Regulations in a footnote. All references to Securities Exchange Act Releases must include the release number, release date, Federal Register cite, Federal Register date, and corresponding file number (e.g., SR-[SRO]-xx-xx). A material failure to comply with these guidelines will result in the proposed rule change, security-based swap submission, or advance notice being deemed not properly filed. See also Rule 0-3 under the Act (17 CFR 240.0-3)

**Exhibit 2 - Notices, Written Comments, Transcripts, Other Communications**

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Exhibit Sent As Paper Document

Copies of notices, written comments, transcripts, other communications. If such documents cannot be filed electronically in accordance with Instruction F, they shall be filed in accordance with Instruction G.

**Exhibit 3 - Form, Report, or Questionnaire**

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Exhibit Sent As Paper Document

Copies of any form, report, or questionnaire that the self-regulatory organization proposes to use to help implement or operate the proposed rule change, or that is referred to by the proposed rule change.

**Exhibit 4 - Marked Copies**

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The full text shall be marked, in any convenient manner, to indicate additions to and deletions from the immediately preceding filing. The purpose of Exhibit 4 is to permit the staff to identify immediately the changes made from the text of the rule with which it has been working.

**Exhibit 5 - Proposed Rule Text**

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The self-regulatory organization may choose to attach as Exhibit 5 proposed changes to rule text in place of providing it in Item I and which may otherwise be more easily readable if provided separately from Form 19b-4. Exhibit 5 shall be considered part of the proposed rule change.

**Partial Amendment**

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If the self-regulatory organization is amending only part of the text of a lengthy proposed rule change, it may, with the Commission's permission, file only those portions of the text of the proposed rule change in which changes are being made if the filing (i.e. partial amendment) is clearly understandable on its face. Such partial amendment shall be clearly identified and marked to show deletions and additions.

1. Text of the Proposed Rule Change

(a) Pursuant to the provisions of Section 19(b)(1) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”)<sup>1</sup> and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,<sup>2</sup> NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC (“PHLX” or the “Exchange”) is filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) a proposed rule change to establish for PHLX orders (“PHLX Orders”) Managed Data Solution fees for non-display usage (“Non-Display Usage”), and to establish that Managed Data Solutions containing Top of PHLX Options (also known as “TOPO”) are for non-display usage.

While the changes proposed herein are effective upon filing, the Exchange has designated that the amendments be operative on November 1, 2013.

The text of the proposed rule change is below. Proposed new language is underlined; proposed deletions are in brackets.<sup>3</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

**NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC PRICING SCHEDULE**

\* \* \* \* \*

**IX. Proprietary Data Feeds**

\* \* \* \* \*

Managed Data Solutions

The charges to be paid by Distributors and Subscribers of Managed Data Solutions products for Non-Display Usage containing Top of PHLX Options shall be:

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<sup>1</sup> 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).

<sup>2</sup> 17 CFR 240.19b-4.

<sup>3</sup> Changes are marked to the rule text that appears in the electronic Nasdaq Manual found at <http://nasdaqomx.cchwallstreet.com>.

<b>Fee schedule for Managed Data Solutions for Non-Display Usage</b>	<b>Price</b>
Managed Data Solution Administration Fee (for the right to offer Managed Data Solutions for Non-Display Usage to client organizations)	\$1,500/mo Per Distributor
PHLX Managed Data Solution Subscriber Fee	\$250/mo per Subscriber

The charges to be paid by Distributors and Subscribers of Managed Data Solutions products containing PHLX Orders shall be:

<b>Fee schedule for Managed Data Solutions for Non-Display Usage</b>	<b>Price</b>
<u>Managed Data Solution Administration Fee</u> (for the right to offer Managed Data Solutions for Non-Display Usage to client organizations)	<u>\$2,000/mo Per Distributor</u>
<u>PHLX Orders Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage Subscriber Fee</u>	<u>\$500/mo per Subscriber</u>

\* \* \* \* \*

(b) Not applicable.

(c) Not applicable.

2. Procedures of the Self-Regulatory Organization

The proposed rule change was approved by senior management of the Exchange pursuant to authority delegated by the Board of Directors of the Exchange on July 17, 2013. Exchange staff will advise the Board of Directors of any action taken pursuant to

delegated authority. No other action by the Exchange is necessary for the filing of the rule change.

Questions regarding this rule filing may be directed to Jonathan F. Cayne, Associate General Counsel, at (301) 978-8493 or Jurij Trypupenko, Associate General Counsel, at (301) 978-8132, NASDAQ OMX Group.

3. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

a. Purpose

PHLX is proposing to create a new data distribution model (a Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage) to further the distribution of the PHLX Orders datafeed. PHLX is also proposing to establish that Managed Data Solutions containing Top of PHLX Options are for non-display usage. The proposed Managed Data Solution for non-display usage is similar to data distribution models currently in use and aligns PHLX with other markets in the NASDAQ OMX Group.<sup>4</sup>

The Managed Data Solution proposal offers a delivery method to firms seeking simplified market data administration. The Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage may be offered by Distributors externally distributing data to clients and/or client organizations that are using the PHLX Orders information internally for Non-Display

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<sup>4</sup> See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 70269 (August 27, 2013), 78 FR 54336 (September 3, 2013)(SR-NASDAQ-2013-106)(notice of filing and immediate effectiveness of proposed rule change to establish non-display Managed Data Solution for equities on NASDAQ); and 69182 (March 19, 2013), 78 FR 18378 (March 26, 2013)(SR-Phlx-2013-28)(notice of filing and immediate effectiveness of proposed rule change to establish non-display Managed Data Solution for Phlx equities market PSX). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69041 (March 5, 2013), 78 FR 15791 (March 12, 2013)(SR-BX-2013-018)(notice of filing and immediate effectiveness of proposed rule change to establish Managed Data Solution for BX).

Usage. This new pricing and administrative option is in response to industry demand, as well as due to changes in the technology used to distribute market data. As such, rather than substantive changes the proposal reflects current data distribution practices in the industry. Distributors offering Managed Data Solutions for Non-Display Usage continue to be fee liable for the applicable distributor fees for the receipt and distribution of PHLX Orders data.

This Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage is a delivery option that will assess a new, innovative fee schedule to Distributors of PHLX Orders that provide data feed solutions such as an Application Programming Interface (API) or similar automated delivery solutions to Recipients for Non-Display Usage with only limited entitlement controls (*e.g.*, usernames and/or passwords) (“Managed Data Recipients”). However, the Distributor must first agree to reformat, redisplay and/or alter the PHLX Orders data prior to retransmission, but not to affect the integrity of the PHLX Orders data and not to render it inaccurate, unfair, uninformative, fictitious, misleading, or discriminatory. A Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage is any retransmission data product containing PHLX Orders offered by a Distributor where the Distributor manages and monitors, but does not control, the information. However, the Distributor does maintain contracts with the Managed Data Recipients and is liable for any unauthorized use by the Managed Data Recipients under a Managed Data Solution. The Recipient of a Managed Data Solution may use the information for internal Non-Display purposes only and may not distribute the information outside of their organization.

Currently, the Exchange does not distinguish between Managed Data Solution Recipients and a recipient of an uncontrolled data product. Some Distributors believe

that the Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage is a viable alternative to an uncontrolled data product. Some Distributors have even delayed deploying new PHLX Orders offerings, pending the initiation of Managed Data Solutions for Non-Display Usage. Thus, offering a Managed Data Solution fee schedule would not only result in PHLX offering lower fees for existing Managed Data Recipients utilizing a Managed Data Solution, but will allow new Distributors to deliver Managed Data Solutions to new clients, thereby increasing transparency of the market.

PHLX proposes to establish two fees for Distributors that adopt the Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage to Distributors, a monthly Managed Data Solution Administration fee of \$2,000 and a monthly Subscriber fee of \$500.<sup>5</sup> The proposed monthly License fee would be in addition to the monthly Distributor fee of \$3,500 (for external usage) currently set forth in Section IX of the PHLX Pricing Schedule, and the \$500 monthly Subscriber fee would be assessed for each Subscriber of a Managed Data Solution. PHLX proposes to establish that Managed Data Solution for Top of PHLX is for non-display usage only,<sup>6</sup> as is done on other markets. The Exchange believes that the proposal is in line with current market practice.

b. Statutory Basis

PHLX believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with the provisions of

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<sup>5</sup> Without a Managed Data Solution as proposed herein, the current fee for internal distribution that is not a Managed Data Solution but rather an uncontrolled PHLX Orders data product with a distributor fee of \$3,000 per month would apply (along with a \$40 professional subscriber fee). Per the proposal for the Managed Data Solution, on the other hand, the managed data recipient fee for non-display internal use of PHLX Orders managed data would be \$500 per subscriber, thereby providing a reduced cost option where the data is for non-distribution only.

<sup>6</sup> The Exchange believes that most firms currently use TOPO in non-display format.

Section 6 of the Act,<sup>7</sup> in general, and with Section 6(b)(4) of the Act,<sup>8</sup> in particular, in that it provides an equitable allocation of reasonable fees among Subscribers and Recipients of PHLX data. In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission granted self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) and broker-dealers (“BDs”) increased authority and flexibility to offer new and unique market data to the public. It was believed that this authority would expand the amount of data available to consumers, and also spur innovation and competition for the provision of market data.

The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS—by lessening the regulation of the market in proprietary data—would itself further the Act’s goals of facilitating efficiency and competition:

[E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive (and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal analysis of the need for such data.<sup>9</sup>

By removing “unnecessary regulatory restrictions” on the ability of exchanges to sell their own data, Regulation NMS advanced the goals of the Act and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If the free market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to BDs at all, it follows that the price at which such data is sold should be set by the market as well.

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<sup>7</sup> 15 U.S.C. 78f.

<sup>8</sup> 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).

<sup>9</sup> Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005), 70 FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“NetCoalition I”), upheld the Commission’s reliance upon competitive markets to set reasonable and equitably allocated fees for market data. “In fact, the legislative history indicates that the Congress intended that the market system ‘evolve through the interplay of competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are removed’ and that the SEC wield its regulatory power ‘in those situations where competition may not be sufficient,’ such as in the creation of a ‘consolidated transactional reporting system.’ NetCoalition I, at 535 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94–229, at 92 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323). The court agreed with the Commission’s conclusion that “Congress intended that ‘competitive forces should dictate the services and practices that constitute the U.S. national market system for trading equity securities.’”<sup>10</sup>

The court in NetCoalition I, while upholding the Commission’s conclusion that competitive forces may be relied upon to establish the fairness of prices, nevertheless concluded that the record in that case did not adequately support the Commission’s conclusions as to the competitive nature of the market for NYSE Arca’s data product at issue in that case. As explained below in PHLX’s Statement on Burden on Competition, however, PHLX believes that there is substantial evidence of competition in the marketplace for data that was not in the record in the NetCoalition I case, and that the Commission is entitled to rely upon such evidence in concluding that the fees established in this filing are the product of competition, and therefore in accordance with the relevant

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<sup>10</sup> NetCoalition I, at 535.

statutory standards.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, PHLX further notes that the product at issue in this filing – PHLX Orders Managed Data Solution fees – is quite different from the NYSE Arca depth-of-book data product at issue in NetCoalition I. Accordingly, any findings of the court with respect to that product may not be relevant to the product at issue in this filing.

4. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement on Burden on Competition

PHLX does not believe that the proposed rule change will result in any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. PHLX’s ability to price its PHLX Orders Managed Data Solution fees is constrained by (1) competition between exchanges and other trading platforms that compete with each other in a variety of dimensions; (2) the existence of inexpensive real-time consolidated data and market-specific data and free delayed consolidated data; and (3) the inherent contestability of the market for this data.

The market for proprietary data products is currently competitive and inherently contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges compete with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself, providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in a vigorously competitive market.

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<sup>11</sup> It should also be noted that Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”) has amended paragraph (A) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3), to make it clear that all exchange fees, including fees for market data, may be filed by exchanges on an immediately effective basis.

Transaction execution and proprietary data products are complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the execution fees, data quality and price and distribution of its data products. Without trade executions, exchange data products cannot exist. Moreover, data products are valuable to many end users only insofar as they provide information that end users expect will assist them or their customers in making trading decisions.

The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing, maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, the operation of the exchange is characterized by high fixed costs and low marginal costs. This cost structure is common in content and content distribution industries such as software, where developing new software typically requires a large initial investment (and continuing large investments to upgrade the software), but once the software is developed, the incremental cost of providing that software to an additional user is typically small, or even zero (e.g., if the software can be downloaded over the internet after being purchased).<sup>12</sup> In PHLX's case, it is costly to build and maintain a

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<sup>12</sup> See William J. Baumol and Daniel G. Swanson, "The New Economy and Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market Power," Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 70, No. 3 (2003).

trading platform, but the incremental cost of trading each additional share on an existing platform, or distributing an additional instance of data, is very low. Market information and executions are each produced jointly (in the sense that the activities of trading and placing orders are the source of the information that is distributed) and are each subject to significant scale economies. In such cases, marginal cost pricing is not feasible because if all sales were priced at the margin, PHLX would be unable to defray its platform costs of providing the joint products.

An exchange's BD customers view the costs of transaction executions and of data as a unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A BD will direct orders to a particular exchange only if the expected revenues from executing trades on the exchange exceed net transaction execution costs and the cost of data that the BD chooses to buy to support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the product exceeds its expected value, the BD will choose not to buy it.

Moreover, as a BD chooses to direct fewer orders to a particular exchange, the value of the product to that BD decreases, for two reasons. First, the product will contain less information, because executions of the BD's trading activity will not be reflected in it. Second, and perhaps more important, the product will be less valuable to that BD because it does not provide information about the venue to which it is directing its orders. Data from the competing venue to which the BD is directing orders will become correspondingly more valuable.

Similarly, in the case of products such as this that are distributed through market data vendors, the vendors provide price discipline for proprietary data products because

they control the primary means of access to end users. Vendors impose price restraints based upon their business models. For example, vendors such as Bloomberg and Reuters that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to offer proprietary products that end users will not purchase in sufficient numbers. Internet portals, such as Google, impose a discipline by providing only data that will enable them to attract “eyeballs” that contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail BDs, such as Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers proprietary data only if it promotes trading and generates sufficient commission revenue. Although the business models may differ, these vendors’ pricing discipline is the same: They can simply refuse to purchase any proprietary data product that fails to provide sufficient value. PHLX and other producers of proprietary data products must understand and respond to these varying business models and pricing disciplines in order to market proprietary data products successfully. Moreover, PHLX believes that products such as this can enhance order flow to PHLX, thereby encouraging wider participation in the market by investors with access to the internet or television. Conversely, the value of such products to distributors and investors decreases if order flow falls, because the products contain less content.

Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is impossible to create data without a fast, technologically robust, and well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading, however, to attribute all of the exchange’s costs to the market data portion of an exchange’s joint product. Rather, all of the exchange’s costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow,

executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about market activity.

The total return that an exchange earns reflects the revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the joint products.

Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible, and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering total costs. For example, some platform may choose to pay rebates to attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market information (or provide information free of charge) and charge relatively high prices for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy of paying lower liquidity rebates to attract orders, setting relatively low prices for accessing posted liquidity and setting relatively high prices for market information. Still others may provide most data free of charge and rely exclusively on transaction fees to recover their costs. Finally, some platforms may incentivize use by providing opportunities for equity ownership, which may allow them to charge lower direct fees for executions and data.

In this environment, there is no economic basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint products in an industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints with regard to the joint offering. Such regulation is unnecessary because an “excessive” price for one of the joint products will ultimately have to be reflected in lower prices for other products sold by the firm, or otherwise the firm will experience a loss in the volume of its sales that will be adverse to its overall profitability. In other words, an increase in the price of data will ultimately have to be accompanied by a decrease in the cost of executions, or the volume of both data and executions will fall.

The level of competition and contestability in the market is evident in the numerous alternative venues that compete for order flow, including thirteen SRO markets, as well as internalizing BDs and various forms of alternative trading systems (“ATSS”), including dark pools and electronic communication networks (“ECNs”). Each SRO market competes to produce transaction reports via trade executions, and two FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting Facilities (“TRFs”) compete to attract internalized transaction reports. It is common for BDs to further and exploit this competition by sending their order flow and transaction reports to multiple markets, rather than providing them all to a single market. Competitive markets for order flow, executions, and transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of proprietary data products.

The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATSS that currently produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each SRO, TRF, ATS, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so, including NASDAQ Stock Market LLC, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE MKT LLC, NYSE Arca, Inc., BATS Exchange, Inc., and Direct Edge.

Any ATS or BD can combine with any other ATS, BD, or multiple ATSS or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple BD’ production of proprietary data products. The potential sources of proprietary products are virtually limitless.

Market data vendors provide another form of price discipline for proprietary data products because they control the primary means of access to end Subscribers. Vendors impose price restraints based upon their business models. For example, vendors such as

Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to offer proprietary products that end Subscribers will not purchase in sufficient numbers. Internet portals, such as Google, impose a discipline by providing only data that will enable them to attract “eyeballs” that contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail broker-dealers, such as Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers proprietary data only if it promotes trading and generates sufficient commission revenue. Although the business models may differ, these vendors’ pricing discipline is the same: they can simply refuse to purchase any proprietary data product that fails to provide sufficient value. PHLX and other producers of proprietary data products must understand and respond to these varying business models and pricing disciplines in order to market proprietary data products successfully.

In addition to the competition and price discipline described above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable. The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook, Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A proliferation of dark pools and other ATSs operate profitably with fragmentary shares of consolidated market volume.

Regulation NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data, has increased the contestability of that market. While BDs have previously published their proprietary data individually, Regulation NMS encourages market data vendors and BDs to produce proprietary products cooperatively in a manner never before possible. Multiple market data vendors already have the capability to aggregate data and disseminate it on a

profitable scale, including Bloomberg, and Thomson Reuters.

Competition among platforms has driven PHLX continually to improve its platform data offerings and to cater to customers' data needs. For example, PHLX has developed and maintained multiple delivery mechanisms (IP, multi-cast, and compression) that enable customers to receive data in the form and manner they prefer and at the lowest cost to them. PHLX has created new products like Depth Data, TOPO and TOPO Plus Orders, because offering data in multiple formatting allows PHLX to better fit customer needs. PHLX offers data via multiple extranet providers, thereby helping to reduce network and total cost for its data products. PHLX has developed an online administrative system to provide customers transparency into their datafeed requests and streamline data usage reporting.

Despite these enhancements and a dramatic increase in message traffic, PHLX's fees for market data have remained flat. In fact, as a percent of total Subscriber costs, PHLX data fees have fallen relative to other data usage costs -- including bandwidth, programming, and infrastructure -- that have risen. The same holds true for execution services; despite numerous enhancements to PHLX's trading platform, absolute and relative trading costs have declined. Platform competition has intensified as new entrants have emerged, constraining prices for both executions and for data.

The vigor of competition for proprietary information is significant and the Exchange believes that this proposal itself clearly evidences such competition. PHLX is offering a new pricing model in order to keep pace with changes in the industry and evolving customer needs. It is entirely optional and is geared towards attracting new customers, as well as retaining existing customers.

The Exchange has witnessed competitors creating new products and innovative pricing in this space over the course of the past year. PHLX continues to see firms challenge its pricing on the basis of the Exchange's explicit fees being higher than the zero-priced fees from other competitors such as BATS. In all cases, firms make decisions on how much and what types of data to consume on the basis of the total cost of interacting with PHLX or other exchanges. Of course, the explicit data fees are but one factor in a total platform analysis. Some competitors have lower transactions fees and higher data fees, and others are vice versa. The market for this proprietary information is highly competitive and continually evolves as products develop and change.

5. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change Received from Members, Participants, or Others

No written comments were either solicited or received.

6. Extension of Time Period for Commission Action

PHLX does not consent at this time to an extension of the time period for Commission action specified in Section 19(b)(2) of the Act.<sup>13</sup>

7. Basis for Summary Effectiveness Pursuant to Section 19(b)(3) or for Accelerated Effectiveness Pursuant to Section 19(b)(2)

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act,<sup>14</sup> the Exchange has designated this proposal as establishing or changing a due, fee, or other charge imposed on any person, whether or not the person is a member of the self-regulatory organization, which renders the proposed rule change effective upon filing.

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<sup>13</sup> 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(2).

<sup>14</sup> 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii). The proposed filing does not result in the dissemination of any new data elements not already disseminated via an approved PHLX product.

8. Proposed Rule Change Based on Rules of Another Self-Regulatory Organization or of the Commission

The proposed rule change is similar to recent filings establishing Managed Data Solutions.<sup>15</sup>

9. Security-Based Swap Submissions Filed Pursuant to Section 3C of the Act

Not applicable.

10. Advance Notices Filed Pursuant to Section 806(e) of the Payment, Clearing and Settlement Supervision Act

Not applicable.

11. Exhibits

1. Completed notice of proposed rule change for publication in the Federal Register.

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<sup>15</sup> See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 70269 (August 27, 2013), 78 FR 54336 (September 3, 2013)(SR-NASDAQ-2013-106)(notice of filing and immediate effectiveness of proposed rule change to establish non-display Managed Data Solution for equities on NASDAQ); and 69182 (March 19, 2013), 78 FR 18378 (March 26, 2013)(SR-Phlx-2013-28)(notice of filing and immediate effectiveness of proposed rule change to establish non-display Managed Data Solution for Phlx equities market PSX). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69041 (March 5, 2013), 78 FR 15791 (March 12, 2013)(SR-BX-2013-018)(notice of filing and immediate effectiveness of proposed rule change to establish Managed Data Solution for BX).

**EXHIBIT 1**SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION  
(Release No. 34- ; File No. SR-Phlx-2013-105)

## Self-Regulatory Organizations; NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change to Establish for PHLX Orders Managed Data Solution Fees for Non-Display Usage

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Act”),<sup>1</sup> and Rule 19b-4 thereunder<sup>2</sup> notice is hereby given that on October 16, 2013, NASDAQ OMX PHLX LLC (“PHLX” or the “Exchange”) filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“Commission”) a proposed rule change as described in Items I and II below, which Items have been prepared by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.

I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Proposed Rule Change

PHLX proposes to establish for PHLX orders (“PHLX Orders”) Managed Data Solution fees for non-display usage (“Non-Display Usage”), and to establish that Managed Data Solutions containing Top of PHLX Options (also known as “TOPO”) are for non-display usage.

While the changes proposed herein are effective upon filing, the Exchange has designated that the amendments be operative on November 1, 2013.

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<sup>1</sup> 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).

<sup>2</sup> 17 CFR 240.19b-4.

The text of the proposed rule change is available at <http://nasdaqomxphlx.cchwallstreet.com/nasdaqomxphlx/phlx/>, at Phlx's principal office, and at the Commission's Public Reference Room.

II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

In its filing with the Commission, the self-regulatory organization included statements concerning the purpose of, and basis for, the proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The text of those statements may be examined at the places specified in Item III below. The Exchange has prepared summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant parts of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose

PHLX is proposing to create a new data distribution model (a Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage) to further the distribution of the PHLX Orders datafeed. PHLX is also proposing to establish that Managed Data Solutions containing Top of PHLX Options are for non-display usage. The proposed Managed Data Solution for non-display usage is similar to data distribution models currently in use and aligns PHLX with other markets in the NASDAQ OMX Group.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 70269 (August 27, 2013), 78 FR 54336 (September 3, 2013)(SR-NASDAQ-2013-106)(notice of filing and immediate effectiveness of proposed rule change to establish non-display Managed Data Solution for equities on NASDAQ); and 69182 (March 19, 2013), 78 FR 18378 (March 26, 2013)(SR-Phlx-2013-28)(notice of filing and immediate effectiveness of proposed rule change to establish non-display Managed Data Solution for Phlx equities market PSX). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 69041 (March 5, 2013), 78 FR 15791 (March 12, 2013)(SR-BX-

The Managed Data Solution proposal offers a delivery method to firms seeking simplified market data administration. The Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage may be offered by Distributors externally distributing data to clients and/or client organizations that are using the PHLX Orders information internally for Non-Display Usage. This new pricing and administrative option is in response to industry demand, as well as due to changes in the technology used to distribute market data. As such, rather than substantive changes the proposal reflects current data distribution practices in the industry. Distributors offering Managed Data Solutions for Non-Display Usage continue to be fee liable for the applicable distributor fees for the receipt and distribution of PHLX Orders data.

This Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage is a delivery option that will assess a new, innovative fee schedule to Distributors of PHLX Orders that provide data feed solutions such as an Application Programming Interface (API) or similar automated delivery solutions to Recipients for Non-Display Usage with only limited entitlement controls (*e.g.*, usernames and/or passwords) (“Managed Data Recipients”). However, the Distributor must first agree to reformat, redisplay and/or alter the PHLX Orders data prior to retransmission, but not to affect the integrity of the PHLX Orders data and not to render it inaccurate, unfair, uninformative, fictitious, misleading, or discriminatory. A Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage is any retransmission data product containing PHLX Orders offered by a Distributor where the Distributor manages and monitors, but does not control, the information. However, the Distributor does maintain

contracts with the Managed Data Recipients and is liable for any unauthorized use by the Managed Data Recipients under a Managed Data Solution. The Recipient of a Managed Data Solution may use the information for internal Non-Display purposes only and may not distribute the information outside of their organization.

Currently, the Exchange does not distinguish between Managed Data Solution Recipients and a recipient of an uncontrolled data product. Some Distributors believe that the Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage is a viable alternative to an uncontrolled data product. Some Distributors have even delayed deploying new PHLX Orders offerings, pending the initiation of Managed Data Solutions for Non-Display Usage. Thus, offering a Managed Data Solution fee schedule would not only result in PHLX offering lower fees for existing Managed Data Recipients utilizing a Managed Data Solution, but will allow new Distributors to deliver Managed Data Solutions to new clients, thereby increasing transparency of the market.

PHLX proposes to establish two fees for Distributors that adopt the Managed Data Solution for Non-Display Usage to Distributors, a monthly Managed Data Solution Administration fee of \$2,000 and a monthly Subscriber fee of \$500.<sup>4</sup> The proposed monthly License fee would be in addition to the monthly Distributor fee of \$3,500 (for external usage) currently set forth in Section IX of the PHLX Pricing Schedule, and the \$500 monthly Subscriber fee would be assessed for each Subscriber of a Managed Data

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<sup>4</sup> Without a Managed Data Solution as proposed herein, the current fee for internal distribution that is not a Managed Data Solution but rather an uncontrolled PHLX Orders data product with a distributor fee of \$3,000 per month would apply (along with a \$40 professional subscriber fee). Per the proposal for the Managed Data Solution, on the other hand, the managed data recipient fee for non-display internal use of PHLX Orders managed data would be \$500 per subscriber, thereby providing a reduced cost option where the data is for non-distribution only.

Solution. PHLX proposes to establish that Managed Data Solution for Top of PHLX is for non-display usage only,<sup>5</sup> as is done on other markets. The Exchange believes that the proposal is in line with current market practice.

## 2. Statutory Basis

PHLX believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,<sup>6</sup> in general, and with Section 6(b)(4) of the Act,<sup>7</sup> in particular, in that it provides an equitable allocation of reasonable fees among Subscribers and Recipients of PHLX data. In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission granted self-regulatory organizations (“SROs”) and broker-dealers (“BDs”) increased authority and flexibility to offer new and unique market data to the public. It was believed that this authority would expand the amount of data available to consumers, and also spur innovation and competition for the provision of market data.

The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS—by lessening the regulation of the market in proprietary data—would itself further the Act’s goals of facilitating efficiency and competition:

[E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive (and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal analysis of the need for such data.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The Exchange believes that most firms currently use TOPO in non-display format.

<sup>6</sup> 15 U.S.C. 78f.

<sup>7</sup> 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).

<sup>8</sup> Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005), 70 FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).

By removing “unnecessary regulatory restrictions” on the ability of exchanges to sell their own data, Regulation NMS advanced the goals of the Act and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If the free market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to BDs at all, it follows that the price at which such data is sold should be set by the market as well.

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“NetCoalition I”), upheld the Commission’s reliance upon competitive markets to set reasonable and equitably allocated fees for market data. “In fact, the legislative history indicates that the Congress intended that the market system ‘evolve through the interplay of competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are removed’ and that the SEC wield its regulatory power ‘in those situations where competition may not be sufficient,’ such as in the creation of a ‘consolidated transactional reporting system.’ NetCoalition I, at 535 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94–229, at 92 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323). The court agreed with the Commission’s conclusion that “Congress intended that ‘competitive forces should dictate the services and practices that constitute the U.S. national market system for trading equity securities.’”<sup>9</sup>

The court in NetCoalition I, while upholding the Commission’s conclusion that competitive forces may be relied upon to establish the fairness of prices, nevertheless concluded that the record in that case did not adequately support the Commission’s conclusions as to the competitive nature of the market for NYSE Arca’s data product at issue in that case. As explained below in PHLX’s Statement on Burden on Competition,

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<sup>9</sup> NetCoalition I, at 535.

however, PHLX believes that there is substantial evidence of competition in the marketplace for data that was not in the record in the NetCoalition I case, and that the Commission is entitled to rely upon such evidence in concluding that the fees established in this filing are the product of competition, and therefore in accordance with the relevant statutory standards.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, PHLX further notes that the product at issue in this filing – PHLX Orders Managed Data Solution fees – is quite different from the NYSE Arca depth-of-book data product at issue in NetCoalition I. Accordingly, any findings of the court with respect to that product may not be relevant to the product at issue in this filing.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement on Burden on Competition

PHLX does not believe that the proposed rule change will result in any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. PHLX’s ability to price its PHLX Orders Managed Data Solution fees is constrained by (1) competition between exchanges and other trading platforms that compete with each other in a variety of dimensions; (2) the existence of inexpensive real-time consolidated data and market-specific data and free delayed consolidated data; and (3) the inherent contestability of the market for this data.

The market for proprietary data products is currently competitive and inherently contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing discipline for the proprietary products themselves.

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<sup>10</sup> It should also be noted that Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”) has amended paragraph (A) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3), to make it clear that all exchange fees, including fees for market data, may be filed by exchanges on an immediately effective basis.

Numerous exchanges compete with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself, providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in a vigorously competitive market.

Transaction execution and proprietary data products are complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the execution fees, data quality and price and distribution of its data products. Without trade executions, exchange data products cannot exist. Moreover, data products are valuable to many end users only insofar as they provide information that end users expect will assist them or their customers in making trading decisions.

The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing, maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, the operation of the exchange is characterized by high fixed costs and low marginal costs. This cost structure is common in content and content distribution industries such as software, where developing new software typically requires a large initial investment (and continuing large investments to upgrade the software), but once the software is developed, the incremental cost of providing that software to an additional

user is typically small, or even zero (e.g., if the software can be downloaded over the internet after being purchased).<sup>11</sup> In PHLX's case, it is costly to build and maintain a trading platform, but the incremental cost of trading each additional share on an existing platform, or distributing an additional instance of data, is very low. Market information and executions are each produced jointly (in the sense that the activities of trading and placing orders are the source of the information that is distributed) and are each subject to significant scale economies. In such cases, marginal cost pricing is not feasible because if all sales were priced at the margin, PHLX would be unable to defray its platform costs of providing the joint products.

An exchange's BD customers view the costs of transaction executions and of data as a unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A BD will direct orders to a particular exchange only if the expected revenues from executing trades on the exchange exceed net transaction execution costs and the cost of data that the BD chooses to buy to support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the product exceeds its expected value, the BD will choose not to buy it. Moreover, as a BD chooses to direct fewer orders to a particular exchange, the value of the product to that BD decreases, for two reasons. First, the product will contain less information, because executions of the BD's trading activity will not be reflected in it. Second, and perhaps more important, the product will be less valuable to that BD because it does not provide information about the venue to which it is directing its orders. Data

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<sup>11</sup> See William J. Baumol and Daniel G. Swanson, "The New Economy and Ubiquitous Competitive Price Discrimination: Identifying Defensible Criteria of Market Power," Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 70, No. 3 (2003).

from the competing venue to which the BD is directing orders will become correspondingly more valuable.

Similarly, in the case of products such as this that are distributed through market data vendors, the vendors provide price discipline for proprietary data products because they control the primary means of access to end users. Vendors impose price restraints based upon their business models. For example, vendors such as Bloomberg and Reuters that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to offer proprietary products that end users will not purchase in sufficient numbers. Internet portals, such as Google, impose a discipline by providing only data that will enable them to attract “eyeballs” that contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail BDs, such as Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers proprietary data only if it promotes trading and generates sufficient commission revenue. Although the business models may differ, these vendors’ pricing discipline is the same: they can simply refuse to purchase any proprietary data product that fails to provide sufficient value. PHLX and other producers of proprietary data products must understand and respond to these varying business models and pricing disciplines in order to market proprietary data products successfully. Moreover, PHLX believes that products such as this can enhance order flow to PHLX, thereby encouraging wider participation in the market by investors with access to the internet or television. Conversely, the value of such products to distributors and investors decreases if order flow falls, because the products contain less content.

Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is impossible to create data without a fast, technologically

robust, and well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading, however, to attribute all of the exchange's costs to the market data portion of an exchange's joint product. Rather, all of the exchange's costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow, executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about market activity. The total return that an exchange earns reflects the revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the joint products.

Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible, and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering total costs. For example, some platform may choose to pay rebates to attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market information (or provide information free of charge) and charge relatively high prices for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy of paying lower liquidity rebates to attract orders, setting relatively low prices for accessing posted liquidity and setting relatively high prices for market information. Still others may provide most data free of charge and rely exclusively on transaction fees to recover their costs. Finally, some platforms may incentivize use by providing opportunities for equity ownership, which may allow them to charge lower direct fees for executions and data.

In this environment, there is no economic basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint products in an industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints with regard to the joint offering. Such regulation is unnecessary because an "excessive" price for one of the joint products will ultimately have to be reflected in lower prices for

other products sold by the firm, or otherwise the firm will experience a loss in the volume of its sales that will be adverse to its overall profitability. In other words, an increase in the price of data will ultimately have to be accompanied by a decrease in the cost of executions, or the volume of both data and executions will fall.

The level of competition and contestability in the market is evident in the numerous alternative venues that compete for order flow, including thirteen SRO markets, as well as internalizing BDs and various forms of alternative trading systems (“ATs”), including dark pools and electronic communication networks (ECNs”). Each SRO market competes to produce transaction reports via trade executions, and two FINRA-regulated TRFs compete to attract internalized transaction reports. It is common for BDs to further and exploit this competition by sending their order flow and transaction reports to multiple markets, rather than providing them all to a single market. Competitive markets for order flow, executions, and transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of proprietary data products.

The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATs that currently produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each SRO, TRF, ATs, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so, including NASDAQ, NYSE, NYSE MKT, NYSE Arca, BATS, and Direct Edge.

Any ATs or BD can combine with any other ATs, BD, or multiple ATs or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple BD’ production of proprietary data products.

The potential sources of proprietary products are virtually limitless.

Market data vendors provide another form of price discipline for proprietary data products because they control the primary means of access to end Subscribers. Vendors impose price restraints based upon their business models. For example, vendors such as Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to offer proprietary products that end Subscribers will not purchase in sufficient numbers. Internet portals, such as Google, impose a discipline by providing only data that will enable them to attract “eyeballs” that contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail broker-dealers, such as Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers proprietary data only if it promotes trading and generates sufficient commission revenue. Although the business models may differ, these vendors’ pricing discipline is the same: they can simply refuse to purchase any proprietary data product that fails to provide sufficient value. PHLX and other producers of proprietary data products must understand and respond to these varying business models and pricing disciplines in order to market proprietary data products successfully.

In addition to the competition and price discipline described above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable. The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook, Island, RediBook, Attain, TracECN, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A proliferation of dark pools and other ATSS operate profitably with fragmentary shares of consolidated market volume.

Regulation NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data, has increased

the contestability of that market. While BDs have previously published their proprietary data individually, Regulation NMS encourages market data vendors and BDs to produce proprietary products cooperatively in a manner never before possible. Multiple market data vendors already have the capability to aggregate data and disseminate it on a profitable scale, including Bloomberg, and Thomson Reuters.

Competition among platforms has driven PHLX continually to improve its platform data offerings and to cater to customers' data needs. For example, PHLX has developed and maintained multiple delivery mechanisms (IP, multi-cast, and compression) that enable customers to receive data in the form and manner they prefer and at the lowest cost to them. PHLX has created new products like Depth Data, TOPO and TOPO Plus Orders, because offering data in multiple formatting allows PHLX to better fit customer needs. PHLX offers data via multiple extranet providers, thereby helping to reduce network and total cost for its data products. PHLX has developed an online administrative system to provide customers transparency into their datafeed requests and streamline data usage reporting.

Despite these enhancements and a dramatic increase in message traffic, PHLX's fees for market data have remained flat. In fact, as a percent of total Subscriber costs, PHLX data fees have fallen relative to other data usage costs -- including bandwidth, programming, and infrastructure -- that have risen. The same holds true for execution services; despite numerous enhancements to PHLX's trading platform, absolute and relative trading costs have declined. Platform competition has intensified as new entrants have emerged, constraining prices for both executions and for data.

The vigor of competition for proprietary information is significant and the

Exchange believes that this proposal itself clearly evidences such competition. PHLX is offering a new pricing model in order to keep pace with changes in the industry and evolving customer needs. It is entirely optional and is geared towards attracting new customers, as well as retaining existing customers.

The Exchange has witnessed competitors creating new products and innovative pricing in this space over the course of the past year. PHLX continues to see firms challenge its pricing on the basis of the Exchange's explicit fees being higher than the zero-priced fees from other competitors such as BATS. In all cases, firms make decisions on how much and what types of data to consume on the basis of the total cost of interacting with PHLX or other exchanges. Of course, the explicit data fees are but one factor in a total platform analysis. Some competitors have lower transactions fees and higher data fees, and others are vice versa. The market for this proprietary information is highly competitive and continually evolves as products develop and change.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change Received From Members, Participants or Others

Written comments were neither solicited nor received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for Commission Action

The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.<sup>12</sup> At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the

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<sup>12</sup> 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(a)(ii).

Act. If the Commission takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic comments:

- Use the Commission's Internet comment form (<http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml>); or
- Send an e-mail to [rule-comments@sec.gov](mailto:rule-comments@sec.gov). Please include File Number SR-Phlx-2013-105 on the subject line.

Paper comments:

- Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-Phlx-2013-105. This file number should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used.

To help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission's Internet Web site (<http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml>). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C.

552, will be available for website viewing and printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the principal offices of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-Phlx-2013-105, and should be submitted on or before [insert date 21 days from publication in the Federal Register].

For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.<sup>13</sup>

Kevin M. O'Neill  
Deputy Secretary

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<sup>13</sup> 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).