For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.24

Sherry R. Haywood,
Assistant Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2022–25088 Filed 11–17–22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011–01–P

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION


Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To Amend Its Schedule of Credits at Equity 7, Section 118(a)

November 15, 2022.


Proposed Rule Change To Amend Its Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Nasdaq Stock Market LLC; Notice of Self-Regulatory Organizations; The COMMISSION

[FR Doc. 2022–25088 Filed 11–17–22; 8:45 am]

Assistant Secretary.

Sherry R. Haywood,

authority.24

69360 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 222 / Friday, November 18, 2022 / Notices

1


2


4

15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4) and (5).


1

2

3

4

5

6

3

4

5

6

The Exchange initially filed the proposed pricing changes on November 1, 2022 (SR–NASDAQ–2022–062). The instant filing replaces SR–NASDAQ–2022–062, which was withdrawn on November 4, 2022.

The Proposal Is Reasonable

The Exchange’s proposed changes to its schedule of credits are reasonable in several respects. As a threshold matter, the Exchange is subject to significant competitive forces in the market for equity securities transaction services that constrain its pricing determinations in that market. The fact that this market is competitive has long been recognized by the courts. In NetCoalition v. Securities and Exchange Commission, the D.C. Circuit stated as follows: ‘‘[n]o one disputes that competition for order flow is ‘fierce.’ . . . As the SEC explained, ‘[i]n the U.S. national market system, buyers and sellers of securities, and the broker-dealers that act as their order-routing agents, have a wide range of choices of where to route orders for execution’; [and] ‘no exchange can afford to take its market share percentages for granted’ because ‘no exchange possesses a monopoly, regulatory or otherwise, in the execution of order flow from broker dealers’ . . . ’”6

The Exchange’s proposed changes to the schedule of credits, at Equity 7, Section 118(a),3 Specifically, with respect to its schedule of credits for non-displayed midpoint orders (other than Supplemental Orders) that provide liquidity, the Exchange proposes to add a new supplemental credit in Tapes A, B and C and make conforming changes to its schedule of credits.

The Exchange proposes to provide a new supplemental credit for midpoint orders (excluding buy (sell) orders with midpoint pegging that receive an execution price that is lower (higher) than the midpoint of the NBBO) that provide liquidity to the Exchange. Specifically, the Exchange proposes to provide a supplemental credit of $0.0001 per share executed for midpoint orders (excluding buy (sell) orders with midpoint pegging that receive an execution price that is lower (higher) than the midpoint of the NBBO) if the member executes at least 0.35% of Consolidated Volume through providing midpoint orders and through Midpoint Extended Life Orders (‘‘M–ELO’’) during the month, and (ii) executes at least 0.20% of Consolidated Volume through providing midpoint orders during the month.

The purpose of the proposed rule change is to amend the Exchange’s schedule of credits, at Equity 7, Section 118(a).3 Specifically, with respect to its schedule of credits for non-displayed midpoint orders (other than Supplemental Orders) that provide liquidity, the Exchange proposes to add a new supplemental credit in Tapes A, B and C and make conforming changes to its schedule of credits.

The Exchange proposes to provide a new supplemental credit for midpoint orders (excluding buy (sell) orders with midpoint pegging that receive an execution price that is lower (higher) than the midpoint of the NBBO) that provide liquidity to the Exchange. Specifically, the Exchange proposes to provide a supplemental credit of $0.0001 per share executed for midpoint orders (excluding buy (sell) orders with midpoint pegging that receive an execution price that is lower (higher) than the midpoint of the NBBO) if the member executes at least 0.35% of Consolidated Volume through providing midpoint orders and through Midpoint Extended Life Orders (‘‘M–ELO’’) during the month, and (ii) executes at least 0.20% of Consolidated Volume through providing midpoint orders during the month.

The purpose of the proposed rule change is to provide extra incentive to members that provide non-displayed liquidity to the Exchange to do so through midpoint orders. The Exchange believes that if such incentive is effective, then any

The Exchange believes that its proposal is consistent with Section 6(b) of the Act,4 in general, and furthers the objectives of Sections 6(b)(4) and 6(b)(5) of the Act,5 in particular, in that it provides for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees and other charges among members and issuers and other persons using any facility, and is not designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.

The Proposal Is Reasonable

The Exchange’s proposed changes to its schedule of credits are reasonable in several respects. As a threshold matter, the Exchange is subject to significant competitive forces in the market for equity securities transaction services that constrain its pricing determinations in that market. The fact that this market is competitive has long been recognized by the courts. In NetCoalition v. Securities and Exchange Commission, the D.C. Circuit stated as follows: ‘‘[n]o one disputes that competition for order flow is ‘fierce.’ . . . As the SEC explained, ‘[i]n the U.S. national market system, buyers and sellers of securities, and the broker-dealers that act as their order-routing agents, have a wide range of choices of where to route orders for execution’; [and] ‘no exchange can afford to take its market share percentages for granted’ because ‘no exchange possesses a monopoly, regulatory or otherwise, in the execution of order flow from broker dealers’ . . . ’”6

The Commission and the courts have repeatedly expressed their preference for competition over regulatory intervention in determining prices, products, and services in the securities markets. In Regulation NMS, while adopting a series of steps to improve the current market model, the Commission highlighted the importance of market forces in determining prices and SRO revenues and, also, recognized that current regulation of the market system “has been remarkably successful in promoting market competition in its

The Exchange’s proposed changes to its schedule of credits, at Equity 7, Section 118(a),3 Specifically, with respect to its schedule of credits for non-displayed midpoint orders (other than Supplemental Orders) that provide liquidity, the Exchange proposes to add a new supplemental credit in Tapes A, B and C and make conforming changes to its schedule of credits.

The Exchange proposes to provide a new supplemental credit for midpoint orders (excluding buy (sell) orders with midpoint pegging that receive an execution price that is lower (higher) than the midpoint of the NBBO) that provide liquidity to the Exchange. Specifically, the Exchange proposes to provide a supplemental credit of $0.0001 per share executed for midpoint orders (excluding buy (sell) orders with midpoint pegging that receive an execution price that is lower (higher) than the midpoint of the NBBO) if the member executes at least 0.35% of Consolidated Volume through providing midpoint orders and through Midpoint Extended Life Orders (‘‘M–ELO’’) during the month, and (ii) executes at least 0.20% of Consolidated Volume through providing midpoint orders during the month.

The purpose of the proposed rule change is to provide extra incentive to members that provide non-displayed liquidity to the Exchange to do so through midpoint orders. The Exchange believes that if such incentive is effective, then any

The Exchange believes that its proposal is consistent with Section 6(b) of the Act,4 in general, and furthers the objectives of Sections 6(b)(4) and 6(b)(5) of the Act,5 in particular, in that it provides for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees and other charges among members and issuers and other persons using any facility, and is not designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.

The Proposal Is Reasonable

The Exchange’s proposed changes to its schedule of credits are reasonable in several respects. As a threshold matter, the Exchange is subject to significant competitive forces in the market for equity securities transaction services that constrain its pricing determinations in that market. The fact that this market is competitive has long been recognized by the courts. In NetCoalition v. Securities and Exchange Commission, the D.C. Circuit stated as follows: ‘‘[n]o one disputes that competition for order flow is ‘fierce.’ . . . As the SEC explained, ‘[i]n the U.S. national market system, buyers and sellers of securities, and the broker-dealers that act as their order-routing agents, have a wide range of choices of where to route orders for execution’; [and] ‘no exchange can afford to take its market share percentages for granted’ because ‘no exchange possesses a monopoly, regulatory or otherwise, in the execution of order flow from broker dealers’ . . . ’”6

The Commission and the courts have repeatedly expressed their preference for competition over regulatory intervention in determining prices, products, and services in the securities markets. In Regulation NMS, while adopting a series of steps to improve the current market model, the Commission highlighted the importance of market forces in determining prices and SRO revenues and, also, recognized that current regulation of the market system “has been remarkably successful in promoting market competition in its

The Exchange believes that its proposal is consistent with Section 6(b) of the Act,4 in general, and furthers the objectives of Sections 6(b)(4) and 6(b)(5) of the Act,5 in particular, in that it provides for the equitable allocation of reasonable dues, fees and other charges among members and issuers and other persons using any facility, and is not designed to permit unfair discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or dealers.

The Proposal Is Reasonable

The Exchange’s proposed changes to its schedule of credits are reasonable in several respects. As a threshold matter, the Exchange is subject to significant competitive forces in the market for equity securities transaction services that constrain its pricing determinations in that market. The fact that this market is competitive has long been recognized by the courts. In NetCoalition v. Securities and Exchange Commission, the D.C. Circuit stated as follows: ‘‘[n]o one disputes that competition for order flow is ‘fierce.’ . . . As the SEC explained, ‘[i]n the U.S. national market system, buyers and sellers of securities, and the broker-dealers that act as their order-routing agents, have a wide range of choices of where to route orders for execution’; [and] ‘no exchange can afford to take its market share percentages for granted’ because ‘no exchange possesses a monopoly, regulatory or otherwise, in the execution of order flow from broker dealers’ . . . ’”6

The Commission and the courts have repeatedly expressed their preference for competition over regulatory intervention in determining prices, products, and services in the securities markets. In Regulation NMS, while adopting a series of steps to improve the current market model, the Commission highlighted the importance of market forces in determining prices and SRO revenues and, also, recognized that current regulation of the market system “has been remarkably successful in promoting market competition in its
broader forms that are most important to investors and listed companies.”

Numerous indicia demonstrate the competitive nature of this market. For example, clear substitutes to the Exchange exist in the market for equity security transaction services. The Exchange is only one of several equity venues to which market participants may direct their order flow. Competing equity exchanges offer similar tiered pricing structures to that of the Exchange, including schedules of rebates and fees that apply based upon members achieving certain volume thresholds.

Within this environment, market participants can freely and often do shift their order flow among the Exchange and competing venues in response to changes in their respective pricing schedules. As such, the proposal represents a reasonable attempt by the Exchange to increase its liquidity and market share relative to its competitors.

The Exchange believes it is reasonable to establish a supplemental credit of $0.0001 per share executed for midpoint orders (excluding buy (sell) orders with midpoint pegging that receive an execution price that is lower (higher) than the midpoint of the NBBO) if the member executes at least 0.35% of Consolidated Volume through providing midpoint orders and through M–ELO during the month, and (ii) executes at least 0.20% of Consolidated Volume through providing midpoint orders during the month. This proposal is reasonable because it will provide extra incentive to members that provide non-displayed liquidity to the Exchange to do so through midpoint orders. The Exchange believes that if such incentive is effective, then any ensuing increase in liquidity to the Exchange will improve market quality, to the benefit of all participants.

The Exchange believes that it is reasonable to exclude from the supplemental credit orders with midpoint pegging which execute at prices less aggressive than the midpoint of the NBBO because such orders already receive price improvements, such that members do not require additional inducements to enter these orders on the Exchange.

The Exchange notes that those market participants that are dissatisfied with the proposal are free to shift their order flow to competing venues that offer more generous pricing or less stringent qualifying criteria.

The Proposal Is an Equitable Allocation of Credits

The Exchange believes its proposal will allocate its charges and credits fairly among its market participants.

The Exchange believes that it is an equitable allocation to establish a new transaction credit because the proposal will encourage the addition of non-displayed liquidity to the Exchange through midpoint orders. To the extent that the Exchange succeeds in increasing the levels of liquidity and activity on the Exchange, then the Exchange will experience improvements in its market quality, which stands to benefit all market participants.

Any participant that is dissatisfied with the proposal is free to shift their order flow to competing venues that provide more generous pricing or less stringent qualifying criteria.

The Proposal Is Not Unfairly Discriminatory

The Exchange believes that its proposal is not unfairly discriminatory. As an initial matter, the Exchange believes that nothing about its volume-based tiered pricing model is inherently unfair; instead, it is a rational pricing model that is well-established and ubiquitous in today’s economy among firms in various industries—from co-branded credit cards to grocery stores to cellular telephone data plans—that use it to reward the loyalty of their best customers that provide high levels of business activity and incent other customers to increase the extent of their business activity. It is also a pricing model that the Exchange and its competitors have long employed with the assent of the Commission. It is fair because it enhances price discovery and improves the overall quality of the equity markets.

The Exchange believes that its proposal to adopt a new credit is not unfairly discriminatory because the credit is available to all members. Moreover, the proposal stands to improve the overall market quality of the Exchange, to the benefit of all market participants, by incentivizing members to increase liquidity adding activity in midpoint orders on the Exchange. Any participant that is dissatisfied with the proposal is free to shift their order flow to competing venues that provide more generous pricing or less stringent qualifying criteria.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement on Burden on Competition

The Exchange does not believe that the proposed rule change will impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.

Intermarket Competition

The Exchange does not believe that its proposal will place any category of Exchange participant at a competitive disadvantage.

As noted above, the Exchange’s proposal to add a new transaction credit is intended to have market-improving effects, to the benefit of all members. Any member may elect to achieve the level of liquidity in midpoint orders and volume in M–ELO required in order to qualify for the new credit.

The Exchange notes that its members are free to trade on other venues to the extent they believe that the Exchange’s fee schedule is not attractive. As one can observe by looking at any market share chart, price competition between exchanges is fierce, with liquidity and market share moving freely between exchanges in reaction to fees and credit changes.

Intermarket Competition

In terms of inter-market competition, the Exchange notes that it operates in a highly competitive market in which market participants can readily favor competing venues if they deem fee levels at a particular venue to be excessive, or rebate opportunities available at other venues to be more favorable. In such an environment, the Exchange must continually adjust its credits and fees to remain competitive with other exchanges and with alternative trading systems that have been exempted from compliance with the statutory standards applicable to exchanges. Because competitors are free to modify their own credits and fees in response, and because market participants may readily adjust their order routing practices, the Exchange believes that the degree to which credit or fee changes in this market may impose any burden on competition is extremely limited.

The proposed new credit is reflective of this competition because, as a threshold issue, the Exchange is a relatively small market so its ability to burden intermarket competition is limited. In this regard, even the largest U.S. equities exchange by volume only has 17–18% market share, which in most markets could hardly be categorized as having enough market power to burden competition. Moreover, as noted above, price competition between exchanges is fierce, with liquidity and market share moving freely between exchanges in reaction to fees and credit changes. This is in...
addition to free flow of order flow to and among off-exchange venues which comprises more than 40% of industry volume in recent months.

The Exchange’s proposal to add a new transaction credit is pro-competitive in that the Exchange intends for the credit to increase liquidity addition activity in midpoint orders on the Exchange, thereby rendering the Exchange a more attractive and vibrant venue to market participants.

In sum, if the changes proposed herein are unattractive to market participants, it is likely that the Exchange will lose market share as a result. Accordingly, the Exchange does not believe that the proposed change will impair the ability of members or competing order execution venues to maintain their competitive standing in the financial markets.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

No written comments were either solicited or received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for Commission Action

The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to section 19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.8

At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission that such action is: (i) necessary or appropriate in the public interest; (ii) for the protection of investors; or (iii) otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments
• Use the Commission’s internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
• Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include File Number SR–NASDAQ–2022–063 on the subject line.

Paper Comments
• Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549–1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR–NASDAQ–2022–063. This file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission’s internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in the Commission’s Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of the filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the principal office of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted without change.

Persons submitting comments are cautioned that we do not redact or edit personal identifying information from comment submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR–NASDAQ–2022–063 and should be submitted on or before December 9, 2022.

For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.9

Sherry R. Haywood, Assistant Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2022–25235 Filed 11–17–22; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 8011–01–P

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[SEC File No. 270–817, OMB Control No. 240.3a71–3(d)]

Proposed Collection; Comment Request; Extension: Rule 3a71–3(d)

Upon Written Request, Copies Available From: Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of FOIA Services, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549–2736


Rule 3a71–3 under the Exchange Act provides in part that, for purposes of determining whether they can avail themselves of the de minimis exception to the “security-based swap dealer” definition, non-U.S. persons must count certain dealing transactions with non-U.S. counterparties that have been “arranged, negotiated, or executed” by personnel in the United States. Rule 3a71–3(d) provides an exception from that “arranged, negotiated, or executed” counting requirement.

The Commission estimates that up to 24 entities may seek to rely on the exception to the de minimis counting requirement of Rule 3a71–3. In connection with the conditions to the exception, each of those up to 24 entities would make use of an affiliated registered security-based swap dealer or registered broker. In general, the registered entity would be required to comply with the collections of information. Applications for “listed jurisdiction” status may be submitted by the up to 24 relying entities, but the staff believes that the greater portion of such applications will be submitted by foreign financial authorities.

The Commission estimates that the total annual time burden for Rule 3a71–3(d), for all respondents, is approximately 235,243 hours per year. In addition, the Commission estimates that the total annual cost burden for Rule 3a71–3(d), for all respondents, is approximately $1,242,595 per year. A detailed break-down of the burdens is provided in the supporting statement.

Written comments are invited on: (a) whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the Commission, including whether the information shall have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the Commission’s estimates of the burden of the proposed collection of information; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information collected; and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the