

Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549, on official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the principal offices of the Exchange. All comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR-ISE-2012-56, and should be submitted on or before July 20, 2012.

For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.⁹

Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-67253; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2012-069]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change To Modify an Optional Depth Data Enterprise License Fee for Broker-Dealer Distribution of Depth-of-Book Data

June 25, 2012.

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Act"),¹ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,² notice is hereby given that on June 12, 2012, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC ("NASDAQ") filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II and III below, which Items have been prepared by NASDAQ. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.

I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of the Substance of the Proposed Rule Change

NASDAQ proposes to modify the optional Enterprise License fee for Non-Professional Subscribers of certain NASDAQ Depth-of-Book market data. NASDAQ will implement the proposed revised fee on July 1, 2012.

* * * * *

7023. NASDAQ Depth-of-Book Data

(a)-(b) No change.

(c) Enterprise License Fees

(1)-(2) No Change.

(3) As an alternative to subsections (1) and (2) above, a Distributor that is also a broker-dealer may pay a monthly fee of \$500,000 [325,000] to provide NASDAQ Level 2, NASDAQ TotalView, or NASDAQ OpenView for Display Usage by Non-Professional Subscribers with whom the firm has a brokerage relationship. This Enterprise License shall not apply to relevant Level 1 or Depth Distributor fees.

(d)-(e) No change.

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II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

In its filing with the Commission, NASDAQ included statements concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in Item IV below. NASDAQ has prepared summaries, set forth in Sections A, B, and C below, of the most significant aspects of such statements.

A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change

1. Purpose

NASDAQ is proposing a change to the Enterprise License Fee for Non-Professional Usage of certain NASDAQ Depth-of-Book market data. NASDAQ Rule 7023(c)(3) offers an optional Enterprise License for unlimited Non-Professional Subscribers of NASDAQ Level 2, NASDAQ TotalView, or NASDAQ OpenView for broker-dealers registered under the Act. Specifically, NASDAQ proposes to increase the optional fee for Distributors from \$325,000 to \$500,000 per month that covers all Non-Professional Subscribers with whom the firm has a brokerage relationship. This Depth-of-Book Enterprise License Fee includes Non-Professional Subscriber fees, but does not include Distributor fees. Non-broker-dealer vendors and application service providers are not eligible for the Enterprise License; such firms typically pass through the cost of market data Subscriber fees to their customers.³

³ NASDAQ relies on Distributor self-reporting of usage rather than on individual contact with each end-user Subscriber. For this Enterprise License,

NASDAQ continues to seek broader distribution of Depth-of-Book data and to reduce the cost of providing Depth-of-Book data to larger numbers of investors. In the past, NASDAQ has accomplished this goal in part by offering similar enterprise licenses for Professional and Non-Professional Usage of TotalView which contains the full Depth-of-Book data for the NASDAQ Market Center Execution System. NASDAQ believes that the adoption of enterprise licenses has led to greater distribution of market data, particularly among Non-Professional Subscribers.

In addition to increased administrative flexibility, enterprise licenses also encourage broader distribution by firms that are currently over the fee cap as well as those that are approaching the cap and wish to take advantage of the benefits of the program. Further, NASDAQ believes that capping fees in this manner creates goodwill with broker-dealers and increases transparency for retail investors.

The Depth-of-Book Enterprise License Fee is completely optional and does not replace existing enterprise license fee alternatives set forth in Rule 7023. Additionally, the proposal does not impact individual Subscriber fees for any product or raise the costs to any Subscriber of any NASDAQ data product. The market for this Depth-of-Book information is highly competitive and continually evolves as products develop and change. As a result, it is proposed that the current fee be increased, in part, due to a change in market data distribution and growing economies of scale in the industry. Subsequent to the introduction of the Depth-of-Book Enterprise License, there has been a substantial change in the adoption rate and distribution of Depth-of-Book data. Additionally, as broker/dealers consolidate and continue to grow organically, NASDAQ needs to adjust its enterprise license pricing model to better reflect current market conditions. The adjustment of this fee reflects these and other market forces.

2. Statutory Basis

NASDAQ believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act,⁴ in general, and with Section 6(b)(4) of the

NASDAQ permits Distributors to designate an entire Subscriber population as Non-Professional provided that the number of Professional Subscribers within that Subscriber population does not exceed ten percent (10%) of the total population.

⁴ 15 U.S.C. 78f.

⁹ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).

¹ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).

² 17 CFR 240.19b-4.

Act,⁵ in particular, in that it provides an equitable allocation of reasonable fees among Subscribers and recipients of NASDAQ data. In adopting Regulation NMS, the Commission granted self-regulatory organizations and broker-dealers increased authority and flexibility to offer new and unique market data to the public. It was believed that this authority would expand the amount of data available to consumers, and also spur innovation and competition for the provision of market data.

The Commission concluded that Regulation NMS—by deregulating the market in proprietary data—would itself further the Act's goals of facilitating efficiency and competition:

[E]fficiency is promoted when broker-dealers who do not need the data beyond the prices, sizes, market center identifications of the NBBO and consolidated last sale information are not required to receive (and pay for) such data. The Commission also believes that efficiency is promoted when broker-dealers may choose to receive (and pay for) additional market data based on their own internal analysis of the need for such data.⁶

By removing “unnecessary regulatory restrictions” on the ability of exchanges to sell their own data, Regulation NMS advanced the goals of the Act and the principles reflected in its legislative history. If the free market should determine whether proprietary data is sold to broker-dealers at all, it follows that the price at which such data is sold should be set by the market as well. Level 2, TotalView and OpenView are precisely the sort of market data products that the Commission envisioned when it adopted Regulation NMS.

On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law H.R. 4173, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank Act”), which amended Section 19 of the Act. Among other things, Section 916 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended paragraph (A) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act by inserting the phrase “on any person, whether or not the person is a member of the self-regulatory organization” after “due, fee or other charge imposed by the self-regulatory organization.” As a result, all SRO rule proposals establishing or changing dues, fees, or other charges are immediately effective upon filing regardless of whether such dues, fees, or other charges are imposed on members of the SRO, non-members, or both.

Section 916 further amended paragraph (C) of Section 19(b)(3) of the Act to read, in pertinent part, “At any time within the 60-day period beginning on the date of filing of such a proposed rule change in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) [of Section 19(b)], the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend the change in the rules of the self-regulatory organization made thereby, if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this title. If the Commission takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings under paragraph (2)(B) [of Section 19(b)] to determine whether the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.”

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in *NetCoalition v. SEC*, No. 09–1042 (D.C. Cir. 2010), although reviewing a Commission decision made prior to the effective date of the Dodd-Frank Act, upheld the Commission's reliance upon competitive markets to set reasonable and equitably allocated fees for market data. “In fact, the legislative history indicates that the Congress intended that the market system ‘evolve through the interplay of competitive forces as unnecessary regulatory restrictions are removed’ and that the SEC wield its regulatory power ‘in those situations where competition may not be sufficient,’ such as in the creation of a ‘consolidated transactional reporting system.’” *NetCoalition*, at 15 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94–229, at 92 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.A.N. 321, 323). The court's conclusions about Congressional intent are therefore reinforced by the Dodd-Frank Act amendments, which create a presumption that exchange fees, including market data fees, may take effect immediately, without prior Commission approval, and that the Commission should take action to suspend a fee change and institute a proceeding to determine whether the fee change should be approved or disapproved only where the Commission has concerns that the change may not be consistent with the Act.

For the reasons stated above, NASDAQ believes that the proposed fees are fair and equitable, and not unreasonably discriminatory. As described above, the proposed fees are based on pricing conventions and distinctions that exist in NASDAQ's current fee schedule, and the fee schedules of other exchanges. These

distinctions (top-of-book versus Depth-of-Book, Professional versus non-Professional Subscribers, Direct versus Indirect Access, Internal versus External Distribution) are each based on principles of fairness and equity that have helped for many years to maintain fair, equitable, and not unreasonably discriminatory fees, and that apply with equal or greater force to the current proposal.

As described in greater detail below, if NASDAQ has calculated improperly and the market deems the proposed fees to be unfair, inequitable, or unreasonably discriminatory, firms can diminish or discontinue the use of their data because the proposed fee is entirely optional to all parties. Firms are not required to purchase Depth-of-Book data or to utilize any specific pricing alternative if they do choose to purchase Depth-of-Book data. NASDAQ is not required to make Depth-of-Book data available or to offer specific pricing alternatives for potential purchases. NASDAQ can discontinue offering a pricing alternative (as it has in the past) and firms can discontinue their use at any time and for any reason (as they often do), including due to their assessment of the reasonableness of fees charged. NASDAQ continues to establish and revise pricing policies aimed at increasing fairness and equitable allocation of fees among Subscribers.

NASDAQ believes that the Depth-of-Book Enterprise License promotes increased transparency by offering a pricing option resulting in lower fees for heavy users of Depth-of-Book data. While NASDAQ may need to periodically adjust the Depth-of-Book Enterprise License to reflect market forces, it continues to view the fee cap as a way for firms to make additional information available to the firms' clients, thereby increasing transparency of the market.

B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition

NASDAQ does not believe that the proposed rule change will result in any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act, as amended. Notwithstanding its determination that the Commission may rely upon competition to establish fair and equitably allocated fees for market data, the *NetCoalition* court found that the Commission had not, in that case, compiled a record that adequately supported its conclusion that the market for the data at issue in the case was competitive. NASDAQ believes that a record may readily be established to

⁵ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).

⁶ Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808 (June 9, 2005), 70 FR 37496 (June 29, 2005).

demonstrate the competitive nature of the market in question.

There is intense competition between trading platforms that provide transaction execution and routing services and proprietary data products. Transaction execution and proprietary data products are complementary in that market data is both an input and a byproduct of the execution service. In fact, market data and trade execution are a paradigmatic example of joint products with joint costs. The decision whether and on which platform to post an order will depend on the attributes of the platform where the order can be posted, including the execution fees, data quality and price and distribution of its data products. Without the prospect of a taking order seeing and reacting to a posted order on a particular platform, the posting of the order would accomplish little. Without trade executions, exchange data products cannot exist. Data products are valuable to many end Subscribers only insofar as they provide information that end Subscribers expect will assist them or their customers in making trading decisions.

The costs of producing market data include not only the costs of the data distribution infrastructure, but also the costs of designing, maintaining, and operating the exchange's transaction execution platform and the cost of regulating the exchange to ensure its fair operation and maintain investor confidence. The total return that a trading platform earns reflects the revenues it receives from both products and the joint costs it incurs. Moreover, an exchange's customers view the costs of transaction executions and of data as a unified cost of doing business with the exchange. A broker-dealer will direct orders to a particular exchange only if the expected revenues from executing trades on the exchange exceed net transaction execution costs and the cost of data that the broker-dealer chooses to buy to support its trading decisions (or those of its customers). The choice of data products is, in turn, a product of the value of the products in making profitable trading decisions. If the cost of the product exceeds its expected value, the broker-dealer will choose not to buy it. Moreover, as a broker-dealer chooses to direct fewer orders to a particular exchange, the value of the product to that broker-dealer decreases, for two reasons. First, the product will contain less information, because executions of the broker-dealer's orders will not be reflected in it. Second, and perhaps more important, the product will be less valuable to that broker-dealer because it does not provide

information about the venue to which it is directing its orders. Data from the competing venue to which the broker-dealer is directing orders will become correspondingly more valuable.

Thus, a super-competitive increase in the fees charged for either transactions or data has the potential to impair revenues from both products. "No one disputes that competition for order flow is 'fierce.'" *NetCoalition* at 24. However, the existence of fierce competition for order flow implies a high degree of price sensitivity on the part of broker-dealers with order flow, since they may readily reduce costs by directing orders toward the lowest-cost trading venues. A broker-dealer that shifted its order flow from one platform to another in response to order execution price differentials would both reduce the value of that platform's market data and reduce its own need to consume data from the disfavored platform. Similarly, if a platform increases its market data fees, the change will affect the overall cost of doing business with the platform, and affected broker-dealers will assess whether they can lower their trading costs by directing orders elsewhere and thereby lessening the need for the more expensive data.

Analyzing the cost of market data distribution in isolation from the cost of all of the inputs supporting the creation of market data will inevitably underestimate the cost of the data. Thus, because it is impossible to create data without a fast, technologically robust, and well-regulated execution system, system costs and regulatory costs affect the price of market data. It would be equally misleading, however, to attribute all of the exchange's costs to the market data portion of an exchange's joint product. Rather, all of the exchange's costs are incurred for the unified purposes of attracting order flow, executing and/or routing orders, and generating and selling data about market activity. The total return that an exchange earns reflects the revenues it receives from the joint products and the total costs of the joint products.

Competition among trading platforms can be expected to constrain the aggregate return each platform earns from the sale of its joint products, but different platforms may choose from a range of possible, and equally reasonable, pricing strategies as the means of recovering total costs. For example, some platform may choose to pay rebates to attract orders, charge relatively low prices for market information (or provide information free of charge) and charge relatively high prices for accessing posted liquidity. Other platforms may choose a strategy

of paying lower rebates (or no rebates) to attract orders, setting relatively high prices for market information, and setting relatively low prices for accessing posted liquidity. In this environment, there is no economic basis for regulating maximum prices for one of the joint products in an industry in which suppliers face competitive constraints with regard to the joint offering. This would be akin to strictly regulating the price that an automobile manufacturer can charge for car sound systems despite the existence of a highly competitive market for cars and the availability of after-market alternatives to the manufacturer-supplied system.

The market for market data products is competitive and inherently contestable because there is fierce competition for the inputs necessary to the creation of proprietary data and strict pricing discipline for the proprietary products themselves. Numerous exchanges compete with each other for listings, trades, and market data itself, providing virtually limitless opportunities for entrepreneurs who wish to produce and distribute their own market data. This proprietary data is produced by each individual exchange, as well as other entities, in a vigorously competitive market.

Broker-dealers currently have numerous alternative venues for their order flow, including ten SRO markets, as well as internalizing BDs and various forms of alternative trading systems ("ATs"), including dark pools and electronic communication networks ("ECNs"). Each SRO market competes to produce transaction reports via trade executions, and two FINRA-regulated Trade Reporting Facilities ("TRFs") compete to attract internalized transaction reports. Competitive markets for order flow, executions, and transaction reports provide pricing discipline for the inputs of proprietary data products.

The large number of SROs, TRFs, BDs, and ATs that currently produce proprietary data or are currently capable of producing it provides further pricing discipline for proprietary data products. Each SRO, TRF, AT, and BD is currently permitted to produce proprietary data products, and many currently do or have announced plans to do so, including NASDAQ, NYSE, NYSE Amex, NYSEArca, and BATS.

Any AT or BD can combine with any other AT, BD, or multiple ATs or BDs to produce joint proprietary data products. Additionally, order routers and market data vendors can facilitate single or multiple broker-dealers' production of proprietary data products.

The potential sources of proprietary products are virtually limitless.

The fact that proprietary data from ATSS, BDs, and vendors can by-pass SROs is significant in two respects. First, non-SROs can compete directly with SROs for the production and sale of proprietary data products, as BATS and Arca did before registering as exchanges by publishing Depth-of-Book data on the Internet. Second, because a single order or transaction report can appear in an SRO proprietary product, a non-SRO proprietary product, or both, the data available in proprietary products is exponentially greater than the actual number of orders and transaction reports that exist in the marketplace.

Market data vendors provide another form of price discipline for proprietary data products because they control the primary means of access to end Subscribers. Vendors impose price restraints based upon their business models. For example, vendors such as Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters that assess a surcharge on data they sell may refuse to offer proprietary products that end Subscribers will not purchase in sufficient numbers. Internet portals, such as Google, impose a discipline by providing only data that will enable them to attract “eyeballs” that contribute to their advertising revenue. Retail broker-dealers, such as Schwab and Fidelity, offer their customers proprietary data only if it promotes trading and generates sufficient commission revenue. Although the business models may differ, these vendors’ pricing discipline is the same: they can simply refuse to purchase any proprietary data product that fails to provide sufficient value. NASDAQ and other producers of proprietary data products must understand and respond to these varying business models and pricing disciplines in order to market proprietary data products successfully.

In addition to the competition and price discipline described above, the market for proprietary data products is also highly contestable because market entry is rapid, inexpensive, and profitable. The history of electronic trading is replete with examples of entrants that swiftly grew into some of the largest electronic trading platforms and proprietary data producers: Archipelago, Bloomberg Tradebook, Island, REDIBook, Attain, TracECN, BATS Trading and Direct Edge. A proliferation of dark pools and other ATSS operate profitably with fragmentary shares of consolidated market volume.

Regulation NMS, by deregulating the market for proprietary data, has

increased the contestability of that market. While broker-dealers have previously published their proprietary data individually, Regulation NMS encourages market data vendors and broker-dealers to produce proprietary products cooperatively in a manner never before possible. Multiple market data vendors already have the capability to aggregate data and disseminate it on a profitable scale, including Bloomberg, and Thomson Reuters.

The court in *NetCoalition* concluded that the Commission had failed to demonstrate that the market for market data was competitive based on the reasoning of the Commission’s *NetCoalition* order because, in the court’s view, the Commission had not adequately demonstrated that the Depth-of-Book data at issue in the case is used to attract order flow. NASDAQ believes, however, that evidence not before the court clearly demonstrates that availability of data attracts order flow. For example, as of July 2010, 92 of the top 100 broker-dealers by shares executed on NASDAQ consumed NQDS and 80 of the top 100 broker-dealers consumed TotalView. During that month, the NQDS-Subscribers were responsible for 94.44% of the orders entered into NASDAQ and TotalView Subscribers were responsible for 92.98%.

Competition among platforms has driven NASDAQ continually to improve its platform data offerings and to cater to customers’ data needs. For example, NASDAQ has developed and maintained multiple delivery mechanisms (IP, multi-cast, and compression) that enable customers to receive data in the form and manner they prefer and at the lowest cost to them. NASDAQ offers front end applications such as its “Bookviewer” to help customers utilize data. NASDAQ has created new products like TotalView Aggregate to complement TotalView ITCH and/NQDS, because offering data in multiple formatting allows NASDAQ to better fit customer needs. NASDAQ offers data via multiple extranet providers, thereby helping to reduce network and total cost for its data products. NASDAQ has developed an online administrative system to provide customers transparency into their data feed requests and streamline data usage reporting. NASDAQ has also expanded its Enterprise License options that reduce the administrative burden and costs to firms that purchase market data.

Despite these enhancements and a dramatic increase in message traffic, NASDAQ’s fees for market data have remained flat. In fact, as a percent of

total Subscriber costs, NASDAQ data fees have fallen relative to other data usage costs—including bandwidth, programming, and infrastructure—that have risen. The same holds true for execution services; despite numerous enhancements to NASDAQ’s trading platform, absolute and relative trading costs have declined. Platform competition has intensified as new entrants have emerged, constraining prices for both executions and for data.

The vigor of competition for Depth-of-Book information is significant and the Exchange believes that this proposal itself clearly evidences such competition. NASDAQ is offering a new pricing model in order to keep pace with changes in the industry and evolving customer needs. It is entirely optional and is geared towards attracting new customers, as well as retaining existing customers.

The Exchange has witnessed competitors creating new products and innovative pricing in this space over the course of the past year. NASDAQ continues to see firms challenge its pricing on the basis of the Exchange’s explicit fees being higher than the zero-priced fees from other competitors such as BATS. In all cases, firms make decisions on how much and what types of data to consume on the basis of the total cost of interacting with NASDAQ or other exchanges. Of course, the explicit data fees are but one factor in a total platform analysis. Some competitors have lower transactions fees and higher data fees, and others are vice versa. The market for this Depth-of-Book information is highly competitive and continually evolves as products develop and change.

C. Self-Regulatory Organization’s Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others

Written comments were neither solicited nor received.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for Commission Action

The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act.⁷ At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule change, the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule change if it appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission

⁷ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(a)(ii). [sic]

takes such action, the Commission shall institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

- Use the Commission's Internet comment form (<http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml>); or
- Send an email to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include File Number SR-NASDAQ-2012-069 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

- Send paper comments in triplicate to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2012-069. This file number should be included on the subject line if email is used.

To help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission's Internet Web site (<http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml>). Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for Web site viewing and printing in the Commission's Public Reference Room on official business days between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection and copying at the principal offices of NASDAQ. All comments received will be posted without change; the Commission does not edit personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit only information that you wish to make available publicly. All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASDAQ-2012-069, and should be submitted on or before July 20, 2012.

For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, pursuant to delegated authority.⁸

Kevin M. O'Neill,
Deputy Secretary.

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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-67246; File No. SR-NASDAQ-2012-071]

Self-Regulatory Organizations; The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change To Amend Rule 4758(a)(1)(A) To Reflect a Change in NASDAQ's Routing Functionality

June 25, 2012.

Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Act"),¹ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,² notice is hereby given that on June 14, 2012, The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC ("NASDAQ" or "Exchange") filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") the proposed rule change as described in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by the self-regulatory organization. The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested persons.

I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the Proposed Rule Change

The Exchange proposes to amend Rule 4758(a)(1)(A) to reflect a change in NASDAQ's routing functionality.

The text of the proposed rule change is below. Proposed new language is in italics; proposed deletions are in brackets.

* * * * *

4758. Order Routing

(a) Order Routing Process

(1) The Order Routing Process shall be available to Participants from 7:00 a.m. until 8:00 p.m. Eastern Time, and shall route orders as described below. All routing of orders shall comply with Rule 611 of Regulation NMS under the Exchange Act.

(A) The System provides a variety of routing options. Routing options may be combined with all available order types and times-in-force, with the exception of order types and times-in-force whose terms are inconsistent with the terms of a particular routing option. The System will consider the quotations only of accessible markets. The

term "System routing table" refers to the proprietary process for determining the specific trading venues to which the System routes orders and the order in which it routes them. Nasdaq reserves the right to maintain a different System routing table for different routing options and to modify the System routing table at any time without notice. The System routing options are:

(i) DOT is a routing option for orders that the entering firm wishes to designate for participation in the NYSE or NYSE Amex opening or closing processes. DOT orders are routed directly to NYSE or NYSE Amex, as appropriate. After attempting to execute in the opening or closing process, DOT orders thereafter check the System for available shares and are converted into SCAN or STGY orders, depending on the designation of the entering firm. DOT orders that are designated to participate in the NYSE or NYSE Amex opening process but that are entered after 9:30 a.m. will also be converted into SCAN or STGY orders, depending on the designation of the entering firm.

(ii) a. DOTI is a routing option for orders that the entering firm wishes to direct to the NYSE or NYSE Amex without returning to the Nasdaq Market Center. DOTI orders check the System for available shares and then are sent to destinations on the System routing table before being sent to NYSE or NYSE Amex, as appropriate. DOTI orders do not return to the Nasdaq Market Center book after routing.

b. The entering firm may alternatively elect to have DOTI orders check the System for available shares and thereafter be directly sent to NYSE or NYSE Amex as appropriate.

(iii) STGY is a routing option under which orders check the System for available shares and *simultaneously route the remaining shares*[then are sent] to destinations on the System routing table. If shares remain unexecuted after routing, they are posted on the book. Once on the book, should the order subsequently be locked or crossed by another accessible market center, the System shall route the order to the locking or crossing market center. SKNY is a form of STGY in which the entering firm instructs the System to bypass any market centers included in the STGY System routing table that are not posting Protected Quotations within the meaning of Regulation NMS.

(iv) SCAN is a routing option under which orders check the System for available shares and *simultaneously route the remaining shares*[then are sent] to destinations on the System routing table. If shares remain unexecuted after routing, they are posted on the book. Once on the book, should the order subsequently be locked or crossed by another market center, the System will not route the order to the locking or crossing market center. SKIP is a form of SCAN in which the entering firm instructs the System to bypass any market centers included in the SCAN System routing table that are not posting Protected Quotations within the meaning of Regulation NMS.

(v) TFTY is a routing option under which orders check the System for available shares only if so instructed by the entering firm and are thereafter routed to destinations on the System routing table. If shares remain un-

⁸ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).

¹ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).

² 17 CFR 240.19b-4.